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Interest in behavioral economics has grown 
in recent years, stimulated largely by accu-
mulating evidence that the standard model of 
consumer decision making provides an inad-
equate, positive description of human behav-
ior. Behavioral models are increasingly finding 
their way into policy evaluation, which inevi-
tably involves welfare analysis. No consensus 
concerning the appropriate standards and crite-
ria for behavioral welfare analysis has emerged 
yet.
This paper summarizes our effort to develop 
a unified framework for behavioral welfare eco-
nomics (for a detailed discussion see Bernheim 
and Rangel 2007)—one that can be viewed as 
a natural extension of standard welfare eco-
nomics. Standard welfare analysis is based on 
choice, not on utility or preferences. In its sim-
plest form, it instructs the planner to respect the 
choices an individual would make for himself. 
The guiding normative principle is an exten-
sion of the libertarian deference to freedom 
of choice, which takes the view that it is bet-
ter to give a person the thing he would choose 
for himself rather than something that someone 
else would choose for him.
We show that it is possible to extend the 
standard choice-theoretic approach to welfare 
analysis to situations where individuals make 
inconsistent choices, which are prevalent in 
behavioral economics.
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I.  Preliminaries
A. Choice Situations and Choices
We use X to denote the set of all possible 
choice objects. Elements of X could be stan-
dard objects such as state-contingent consump-
tion bundles or lotteries over such bundles, but 
these objects could also have nonstandard fea-
tures (e.g., as in Andrew Caplin and John Leahy 
2001).
A standard choice situation (SCS) consists 
of a constraint set X # X, representing the set 
of objects from which the individual can choose 
according to the objective information at his 
disposal. We are concerned with making wel-
fare judgments based on behavior for some par-
ticular domain of standard choice situations, X.
To accommodate choice inconsistencies, we 
introduce the notion of a generalized choice 
situation (GCS), G. This consists of a standard 
choice situation, X, and a set of ancillary con-
ditions, d. Thus, G 5 1X,d 2 . We will use G to 
denote the set of generalized choice situations of 
potential interest. Examples of ancillary condi-
tions include the point in time at which the deci-
sion is made, the manner in which information 
is presented, and the labelling of some options 
as defaults. Behavior is represented by a choice 
correspondence C : G S X; for any G [ G, any 
x [ C 1G 2  is an action that the individual is 
willing to choose.
As a general matter, it is difficult to draw a 
bright line between the characteristics of the 
objects in X and the ancillary conditions d 
(which, in principle, one could also view as a 
characteristic of the objects in the choice set). 
Our analytic framework is applicable regardless 
of how one draws this distinction.
Standard economics proceeds from the 
assumption that choice is invariant with respect 
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to ancillary conditions. Positive behavioral eco-
nomics challenges this basic premise since there 
are many examples of choice reversals in which 
C 1X, d r 2 2 C 1X, ds 2  for two ancillary condi-
tions d r and ds.
B. Positive versus Normative analysis
Usually, choice data are not available for all 
elements of G, but rather for elements of some 
set H , G. The objective of positive economic 
analysis is to extend the choice correspondence 
C from observations on to the entire set G. In 
standard economics, this is accomplished by 
defining preferences over X, estimating these 
preferences with choice data for the opportunity 
sets in H, and using these estimated preferences 
to infer choices for opportunity sets in G\H.
The objective of normative economic analysis 
is to evaluate outcomes. Typically, we evaluate 
outcomes at the level of the individual, and then 
aggregate. For choice-based normative crite-
ria, we allow the individual’s choices to govern 
these evaluations. The fundamental problem 
of behavioral welfare economics is to identify 
appropriate criteria for evaluating alternatives 
when, due to choice reversals and other behav-
ioral anomalies, the individual’s choices fail to 
provide clear guidance.
In conducting choice-based normative analy-
sis, we take as given the individual’s choice cor-
respondence, C, defined on G rather than H. 
Preferences and utility functions, which are 
constructs used both in standard theory and in 
behavioral economics to extend C from H to G, 
are therefore positive tools, not normative tools. 
In a behavioral setting, these constructs cannot 
meaningfully reconcile inconsistencies. They 
can only reiterate the information contained in 
the extended choice correspondence C. Thus, 
one cannot resolve normative puzzles by iden-
tifying classes of preferences that rationalize 
apparently inconsistent choices, as in Faruk Gul 
and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (2001).
II.  A Framework for Behavioral Welfare 
Analysis
In the standard approach to normative analy-
sis, one evaluates individual welfare by apply-
ing a “revealed preference” relation, r, defined 
over the elements of X, which summarizes what 
is chosen from various SCSs. Under standard 
assumptions, r is an ordering. When we use 
this ordering to conduct welfare analysis, we are 
simply asking what an individual or individu-
als would choose. For example, the compensat-
ing variation associated with some change in 
the economic environment equals the smallest 
payment that would induce the individual to 
choose the change. Similarly, a social alterna-
tive x [ X is a Pareto optimum in X if there 
is no other alternative in X that all individuals 
would choose over x.
In behavioral economics, we often cannot 
summarize all choices with a consistent prefer-
ence ordering. Instead, choice evidence is some-
times ambiguous. Fortunately, we can live with 
this ambiguity. It is still possible to construct 
binary relations based on unambiguous com-
parisons that allow us to carry out meaningful 
welfare analyses.
A. individual welfare Orderings
In standard welfare economics, the statement 
xry means that if x and y are available in X, and 
if y is in C 1X 2 , then x is also in C 1X 2 . Our pro-
posal is to conduct behavioral welfare econom-
ics by generalizing this binary relation. In effect, 
xry will mean that if x and y are available in G, 
and if y is in C 1G 2 , then x is in C 1G 2 . We do not 
pretend that this relation reveals preference. It is 
simply a summary of what is chosen.
More specifically, for any x, y [  X, we will 
say that xry if, whenever x and y are avail-
able, x is sometimes chosen, and y is never 
chosen unless x is as well. Formally, (i) there 
exists some (X, d) [ G with 5x, y6 # X such that 
x [ C 1X,  d 2 , and (ii) there does not exist any 
(X, d) [ G with 5x, y6 [ X such that y [ C 1X, d 2  
and x o C 1X, d 2 . Note that xrx.
As usual, we can define xPy as xry and ,yRx. 
This means that, whenever x and y are available, 
sometimes x is chosen but not y, and otherwise 
either both or neither is chosen. Likewise, we 
can define xiy as xry and yrx. This means that, 
whenever x is chosen, so is y, and vice versa.
Finally, we will say that xP*y if, whenever x 
and y are available, sometimes x is chosen but 
not y, and otherwise neither is chosen. Formally, 
(i) for all (X, d) [ G with 5x, y6 # X, we have 
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y o C 1X, d 2 , and (ii) for some (X, d) [ G with 5x,  y6 # X, we have x [ C 1X,  d 2 .
In general, r, P, and P* need not be order-
ings. For example, if C 15x, y 6, d92 5 5x6 and 
C 15x, y 6, d0 2 5 5y 6, then we have neither xry 
nor yrx, so r is not complete. Moreover, r, 
P, and P* need not be transitive (though P* 
is acyclic). For example, if choice does not 
depend on ancillary conditions, and if we have 
C 15x1, x262 5 x1, C 15x2, x362 5 x2, C 15x3, x162 
5 x3, and C 15x1, x2, x362 5 5x1, x2, x36, then 
x1 Px2 Px3 Px1.
B. individual welfare Optima
There are two natural criteria for determin-
ing whether a choice is improvable. We will 
say that it is possible to strictly improve upon 
a choice x [ X if there exists y [ X, such that 
yP*x. In other words, there is an alternative that 
is unambiguously chosen over x. When a strict 
improvement is impossible, we say that x is a 
weak individual welfare optimum. It is possible 
to weakly improve upon a choice x [ X if there 
exists y [ X such that yPx. In other words, there 
is an alternative y that is sometimes chosen over 
x, and that x is never chosen over y (except in the 
sense that both could be chosen). When a weak 
improvement is impossible, we say that x is a 
strict individual welfare optimum.
When is x [ X an individual welfare opti-
mum? The following simple results (which we 
state without proof) assume that G includes all 
pairwise comparisons (that is, for all a, b [ X, 
there is some dab such that ({a, b, dab) [ G).
FACT 1: x is a weak individual welfare optimum 
in X if and only if for each y [ X (other than x), 
there is some GCS for which x is chosen with y 
present (y may be chosen as well).
This result has an immediate corollary. If x 
is chosen for some GSC involving X, then x is a 
weak individual welfare optimum in X. Notice 
that this corollary guarantees the existence of 
weak individual welfare optima.
FACT 2: x  is a strict individual welfare opti-
mum in X if for each y [ X (other than x) either 
x is chosen and y is not for some GCS with y 
present, or there’s no GCS for which y is chosen 
and x is not with x present.
This result also has an immediate corollary: 
if x is the unique choice for some GSC involving 
X, then x is a strict individual welfare optimum 
in X. A strict individual welfare optimum may 
not exist (see the example given at the end of 
Section IA).
C. relationship to multi-Self Pareto Optima
Our notion of an individual welfare opti-
mum is related to the idea of a multi-self Pareto 
optimum. Suppose, in particular, that the set of 
GCSs is the Cartesian product of the set of SCSs 
and a set of ancillary conditions (that is, G 5 X 
3 D, where d [ D). Also imagine that, for each 
d [ D, choices follow standard axioms, and can 
be represented by a preference ranking Rd. If one 
imagines that each ancillary condition activates 
a different “self,” then one can conduct welfare 
analysis by examining multi-self Pareto optima. 
Under the stated conditions, a weak multi-self 
Pareto optimum corresponds to a weak individ-
ual welfare optimum (as we have defined it), and 
a strict multi-self Pareto optimum corresponds 
to a strict individual welfare optimum. For these 
narrow settings, our approach is equivalent to 
the multi-self Pareto criterion. Our approach 
is also more general, however, in that it does 
not require the assumptions stated at the outset 
of this paragraph. Moreover, it can justify the 
multi-self Pareto criterion without reference to 
questionable psychological assumptions.
D. equivalent and Compensating Variation
The concepts of equivalent and compensating 
variation are central to applied welfare econom-
ics. Fortunately, they have natural counterparts 
within our framework. Here, we will focus on 
compensating variation. Our treatment of equiv-
alent variation is analogous.
We will write the individual’s SCS as X 1a, m 2 , 
where a is a vector of parameters, and m is the 
level of compensation. Let a0 be the initial param-
eter vector, d0 the initial ancillary conditions, and 1X 1a0, 0 2 , d0 2  the initial GCS. We will consider 
a change in parameters to a1, coupled with some 
level of compensation, as well as (potentially) 
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a change in ancillary conditions that could, in 
principle, depend on the compensation level. We 
write the new GCS as 1X 1a1, m 2 , d 1m 2 2 . One 
natural possibility, but certainly not the only 
one, is to take d 1m 2 5 d r for some fixed d r. This 
allows us, for example, to evaluate compensating 
variations for fixed changes in prices, ancillary 
conditions, or both.
Here, we will define the compensating variation 
relative to particular selections from the choice 
correspondence (see Bernheim and Rangel 2007 
for some alternatives). Accordingly, we assume 
the individual selects x0 [ C 1X 1a0, 0 2 , d0 2 , and 
x 1m 2 [ C 1X 1a1, m 2 , d 1m 2 2 .
In defining the compensating variation, we 
encounter an ambiguity concerning the standard 
of compensation. Do we consider compensation 
sufficient when x 1m 2  is always weakly chosen 
over x0, or when x0 is not always weakly cho-
sen over x 1m 2? This ambiguity is an essential 
feature of welfare evaluations with inconsistent 
choice. Accordingly, we define two notions of 
compensating variation:
 mCV2A 5  inf 
m
x 1m 2P*x0,
 mCV2B 5 sup
m    
x0 P*x 1m 2 .
We illustrate the application of these concepts 
by discussing the measurement of consumer 
surplus.
E. Consumer Surplus
For simplicity, we will examine a case where 
the individual consumes two goods: x and y. 
Suppose that positive analysis delivers the fol-
lowing utility representation (which involves 
no income effects, so that Marshallian con-
sumer surplus would be valid in the standard 
framework):
 U 1x, y 0  d 2 5 x 1 dv 1y 2 ,
with v strictly increasing, differentiable, and 
strictly concave. Thus, for any given d, the 
inverse demand curve for y is given by p 5 
dv91y 2 , where p is the price of y. Notice that 
the ancillary condition, d [ [dL, dh ], simply 
shifts the weight attached to v 1y 2 . This might, 
for example, represent the type of “coherent 
 arbitrariness” documented by Dan Ariely, George 
Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec (2003).
Let m denote the consumer’s initial income. 
Consider a change in the price of y from p0 to p1, 
along with a change in ancillary conditions from 
d0 to d1. Let y0 denote the amount of y purchased 
at price p0, and let y1 denote the amount pur-
chased at price p1. Assume that y0 . y1. Since 
there are no income effects, y1 will not change 
as the individual is compensated (holding the 
ancillary condition fixed).
Now let us calculate CV-A. We wish to find 
the smallest m such that (y1, m 2 p1y1 1 m) 
P*(y0, m 2 p0 y0 ). It is straightforward to show 
that the solution is
 mCV2a 5 [p1 2 p0 ]y1 1 3
y0
y1
[dhv9(y) 2 p0 ] dy.
Through similar reasoning, one can show that
 mCV2B 5 [p1 2 p0 ]y1 1 3
y0
y1
[dLv9(y) 2 p0 ] dy.
Figures 1(A) and 1(B) illustrate mCV2A (the 
shaded area above p0) and mCV2B (the shaded 
area above p0 minus the shaded area below p0), 
respectively, for the case where d0 5 d1 5 d. 
Notice that these values bracket standard con-
sumer surplus. Moreover, as the range of possi-
ble ancillary conditions narrows, they converge 
to standard consumer surplus. This underscores 
the fact that the standard framework is a spe-
cial case of the framework considered here. 
Moreover, it also implies that, when inconsis-
tencies are minor (that is, dH 2 dL is small), the 
ambiguity in welfare, as measured by the differ-
ence between mCV2A and mCV2B, is small.
F. Generalized Pareto Optima
Next, we turn to environments with many indi- 
viduals, and formulate a generalization of 
Pareto efficiency. Suppose there are N individu-
als indexed i 5 1, … , N. Let X denote the set of 
all conceivable social choice objects, and let X 
denote the set of feasible objects. Let Ci be the 
choice function for individual i, defined over Gi 
(where the subscript reflects the possibility that 
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the set of ancillary conditions may differ from 
individual to individual). These choice func-
tions induce the relations Ri and Pi* over X.
We  will  say  that  x  is  a  weak  generalized  Pareto 
optimum in X if there exists no y [ X with yP*i x 
for all i. We will say that x is a strict generalized 
Pareto optimum in X if there exists no y [ X 
with yRix for all i, and yP*i x for some i.
Since strict individual welfare optima do not 
always exist, we cannot guarantee the existence 
of strict generalized Pareto optima with a high 
degree of generality. We can guarantee the exis-
tence of a weak generalized Pareto optimum, 
however.
G. The efficiency of Competitive equilibria
To illustrate the usefulness of these concepts, we 
have provided a generalization of the first welfare 
theorem. Specifically, we consider a production 
economy consisting of N consumers, F firms, and 
K goods. The economy is standard in all respects, 
except that consumer i’s behavior is governed by 
a general choice correspondence mapping budget 
sets and ancillary conditions into sets of consump-
tion vectors. We make one simple assumption 
(akin to nonsatiation) with respect to consumer 
behavior: if xn . wn (where . indicates a strict 
inequality for every good), then consumer n never 
chooses wn when xn is available.
A behavioral competitive equilibrium involves 
a price vector, pˆ 5 (pˆ1, … , pˆK), along with a 
vector of ancillary conditions, dˆ  5 (dˆ 1, … , dˆ N), 
which clear all markets. Though behavioral 
competitive equilibria may not exist, those that 
do exist are necessarily efficient.
THEOREM 1: The allocation in any behavioral 
competitive equilibrium is a strict generalized 
Pareto optimum.
It is worth emphasizing that a perfectly com-
petitive equilibrium may be inefficient when 
judged by a refined welfare relation, after offi-
ciating choice conflicts, as described in the next 
section. This observation alerts us to the fact 
that, in behavioral economics, choice reversals 
lead to a new class of potential market failures.
III.  Refinements
A. The Logic of refinements
In any particular context, the relation r and 
P* that we have defined may not be very discern-
ing, which means that many choice alternatives 
might be individual welfare optima. In this sec-
tion, we consider the possibility that one might 
refine the relations r and P* by altering the data 
used to construct them. Most obviously, one can 
add choice data (by creating new GCSs, expand-
ing the domain G), or delete data (by ignoring 
certain GCSs, reducing the domain G). There is 
also the possibility of reinterpreting choice data, 
which we mention briefly below.
Figure 1
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We say that R r is coarser than r if xR ry implies 
xry. When R r is coarser than r, we say that r 
is finer than R r. Subject to a technical qualifica-
tion, the addition of data (that is, the expansion 
of G) makes r weakly coarser, while the elimi-
nation of data (that is, the reduction of G) makes 
r weakly finer. Thus, to usefully refine the wel-
fare relations, one must either eliminate or rein-
terpret data. Accordingly, if there is one GCS in 
which x is chosen over y, and another in which 
y is chosen over x, we look for objective criteria 
that might allow us to officiate between these 
GCSs, with the object of discarding or reinter-
preting one of them. We can then construct a 
new welfare relation, R r, based on the revised 
choice correspondence, which may be finer than 
r and contain fewer welfare optima. The same 
comments apply for P*.
How might we officiate between conflict-
ing GCSs? One seemingly natural possibility, 
which we call “self-officiation,” is to officiate 
based on choices. If the individual makes con-
flicting choices for two GCSs, G1 5 1X, d1 2  
and G2 5 1X, d2 2 , simply allow him to choose 
between these GCSs. This, however, creates 
another GCS, call it G3 5 1X, d3 2 . Since the 
expansion of G to include G3 does not refine 
usefully either the welfare relation or the sets 
of welfare optima, we have an “irresolvability 
principle”—new choices cannot resolve norma-
tive ambiguities associated with existing choice 
conflicts. To officiate, we must therefore rely on 
nonchoice data.
B. refinements Based on information 
Processing
When we say that an individual’s standard 
choice situation is X, we mean that, based on all 
of the objective information that is available to 
him, he is actually choosing among elements of 
X. In standard economics, we use this objective 
information to reconstruct X, and then infer that 
he prefers his chosen element to all the uncho-
sen elements of X. But what if he fails to use 
all of the information available to him, or uses 
it incorrectly? What if the objective informa-
tion available to him implies that he is actually 
choosing from the set X, while in fact he believes 
he is choosing from some other set, Y? In that 
case, should a planner nevertheless mimic his 
choice when making a selection from X? Not in 
our view.
Why would the individual believe himself 
to be choosing from some set, Y, when in fact, 
according to the available objective informa-
tion, he is choosing from the set X? His atten-
tion may focus on some small subset of X. His 
memory may fail to call up facts that relate 
choices to consequences. He may forecast the 
consequences of his choices incorrectly. He may 
have learned from his past experiences more 
slowly than the objective information would 
permit. Thus, the operations of these cognitive 
processes pertain to the question of whether, at 
the moment of choice, he appreciates that he is 
choosing from X.
In principle, if we understand the individual’s 
cognitive processes sufficiently well, we may be 
able to identify his perceived choice set Y, and 
to reinterpret the choice as pertaining to the set 
Y rather than to the set X. We refer to this pro-
cess as “deconstructing choices.” While it may 
be possible to accomplish this in some instances 
(see, e.g., Botond Ko˝szegi and Matthew Rabin 
2007), we suspect that, in most cases, this is 
beyond the current capabilities of science. We 
nevertheless submit that there are circumstances 
in which nonchoice evidence can reliably estab-
lish the existence of a significant discrepancy 
between the actual choice set, X, and the per-
ceived choice set, Y. This occurs, for example, in 
circumstances where it is known that attention 
wanders, memory fails, forecasting is naive, 
and/or learning is slow. In these instances, we 
say that the GCS is suspect.
We propose using nonchoice evidence to 
officiate between conflicting choice data by 
deleting suspect GCSs. Thus, for example, if 
someone chooses x from X under condition d r, 
where he is likely to be distracted, and chooses 
y from X under condition ds, where he is likely 
to be focused, we would delete the data asso-
ciated with (X, d9) before constructing the wel-
fare relations. In effect, we take the position 
that (X, d0) is a better guide for the planner than 
(X, d9). Even with the deletion of choice data, 
the welfare relations may remain ambiguous in 
many cases due to other unresolved choice con-
flicts, but they nevertheless become (weakly) 
finer, and the sets of welfare optima grow 
(weakly) smaller.
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What types of nonchoice evidence might one 
use to determine the circumstances in which 
internal information processing systems work 
well, and the circumstances in which they work 
poorly? Evidence from neuroscience concerning 
the functioning of various cognitive processes 
can potentially shed light on the operation of 
processes governing attention, memory, fore-
casting, and learning. This evidence can provide 
an objective basis for determining whether a par-
ticular choice situation is suspect. For example, 
if memory is shown to function poorly under 
certain environmental conditions, GSCs that 
are associated with those conditions, and that 
require factual recall, are suspect. Our work on 
addiction (Bernheim and Rangel 2004) provides 
a more elaborate illustration. Citing evidence 
from neuroscience, we argue that the habitual 
use of addictive substances causes specific infor-
mation processing systems to malfunction under 
identifiable circumstances. The choices made in 
these circumstances are therefore suspect, and 
welfare evaluations should be guided by choices 
made in other circumstances. More generally, 
these observations define a normative agenda 
for the emerging field of neuroeconomics.
In many situations, simpler forms of evidence 
may suffice. If, for example, an individual char-
acterizes a choice as a mistake on the grounds 
that he neglected or misunderstood information, 
this may provide a compelling basis for declar-
ing the choice suspect. Other considerations, 
such as the complexity of a GCS, could also 
come into play.
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